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Youth in Adult Court:
Rethinking Illinois' Use of Discretionary Transfer
Nicole Pijon*

Our state, home of the country's first juvenile court and once a

leader in juvenile justice reform, should not be a place where we
boast of locking up juveniles and throwing away the key. Illinois
should be a place where youth matters. . .i.
- Justice Mary J. Theisl
INTRODUCTION

In 1899-well over a century ago-Illinois laid a cornerstone for juvenile justice
reform by creating the first juvenile court in the nation. 2 Rather than adopting the punitive
principles of its adult counterpart, the juvenile court based its philosophy upon
rehabilitating and protecting youth. 3 A perceived spike in juvenile crime in the 1980s,
however, prompted policymakers to embrace a "tough on crime" approach that lasted until
the turn of the century. 4 This period was marked by the reduction of juvenile court
jurisdiction and the enactment of harsh transfer laws across the country, despite declining
rates of juvenile crime in the mid-1990s. 5 During this time span, Illinois, like most states,
employed three mechanisms for trying youth in adult court: mandatory transfers,
presumptive transfers, and discretionary transfers. 6 As a result, the number of youth
prosecuted in both juvenile and adult court increased dramatically. 7
Illinois has implemented progressive reform over the past two decades in an effort
to realign its juvenile justice system with its original goals. The legislature, for example,
has raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, abolished mandatory transfers, and limited
eligibility criteria for presumptive transfers. 8 Given these substantial improvements, the
* Nicole Pijon obtained her J.D. from Loyola University Chicago School of Law in 2021 and her B.S. from
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2017.
1 People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 177 (Theis, J., dissenting).

2 LINDSAY BOSTWICK, ILL. CRIM. JUST. INFO. AUTH., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE

JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2010), http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/pdf/ResearchReports/IL_JuvenileJustice_Sys
tern_Walkthrough_0810.pdf.
3 Id.
4 See KANAKO ISHIDA ET AL., JUV. JUST. INITIATIVE, AUTOMATIC ADULT PROSECUTION OF CHILDREN IN

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS. 2010-2012, at 5 (2014), http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/532.
5 Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, JUV.
OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: NAT'L REP. SERIES BULL., Sept. 2011, at 1,

8-9,

https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf.
6 Id. at 3.
? Roger Przybylski, With Higher Numbers of Children Entering Their Crime-Prone Years, More Needs to
Be Done to Address IncreasingRates of Juvenile Violence, COMPILER, Summer 1996, at 4, 5.
' Pub. Act 95-1031, 2008 Ill. Laws 3971 (raising the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction from
seventeen to eighteen for misdemeanor offenses); Pub. Act 98-61, 2013 Ill. Laws 1709 (raising the age of
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state's discretionary transfer provision often goes overlooked. This article examines the
problems posed by the language of the discretionary transfer mechanism in light of
constitutional standards and emerging research. It argues that the provision is
fundamentally incompatible with contemporary concepts of juvenile culpability.
Part I outlines the development of Illinois' statutory transfer scheme within the
context of broader national trends. While the state has shifted its policy on mandatory and
presumptive transfers in recent years, its discretionary transfer provision remains
untouched. Part II evaluates the provision's arbitrary determination that youth as young as
thirteen years old are capable of forming the identical requisite mens rea as adults. Part III
discusses the implications of the broad discretion afforded to juvenile court judges and
analyzes the inherently subjective nature of transfer determinations. Part IV demonstrates
how adult courts subject transferredjuveniles to harsh punishment under the state criminal
code, with few constitutional protections shielding them from unduly long sentences.
Lastly, Part V urges Illinois to implement certain restrictions to conform its discretionary
transfer with contemporary understandings of juvenile criminal responsibility. In
particular, the state should consider increasing the minimum age for transfer, categorically
excluding certain types of crimes from eligibility, altering the balancing test employed in
transfer hearings, and adopting a reverse waiver provision. In the absence of these or
comparable safeguards, Illinois youth will continue to face unnecessary criminalization.
I.

BACKGROUND

Illinois invoked the doctrine of parens patriae, the inherent authority of a state to
assume guardian power over its youth, to establish the nation's first juvenile court in Cook
County through the Juvenile Court Act of 1899.9 In creating a new realm of judicial
jurisdiction solely for minors under the age of sixteen, Illinois became the first state to
formally recognize that children are fundamentally different from adults. 10 Other states
followed suit shortly thereafter, with all but two instituting their own juvenile court systems
by 1925.11
Judge Julian W. Mack, one of the first judges to preside over the Cook County
Juvenile Court in the early twentieth century, articulated the goals of juvenile court as
follows:

original juvenile court jurisdiction from seventeen to eighteen for felony offenses); Pub. Act 99-258, 2015
Ill. Laws 4718 (eliminating mandatory transfers and removing enumerated list of offenses qualifying for
presumptive transfer).
9 See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131; Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile
Justice:A Century of Change, JUv. JUST. BULL., Dec. 1999, at 1, 2,
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178995.pdf.
10 Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131; see HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFF. OF
JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 94

(2006), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/.
" SUZANNE CAVANAGH & DAVID TEASLEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 92-633 GOV, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES 2 (1992),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/139229NCJRS.pdf.
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The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made
to know that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he
should at the same time, and more emphatically, be made to feel that
he is the object of its care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of
the court-room are out of place in such hearings. The judge on a
bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, can never
evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at
his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder
and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial
dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.12
This notion-that youth should be the object of the state's care and solicitude
encapsulates the fundamental difference between juvenile and adult courts. Children ought
to be protected and rehabilitated, not punished. Although the state created the juvenile court
to defend youth from the clutches of the adult penal system, it nonetheless transferred its
first juvenile to face adult criminal prosecution a mere four years after the court's
founding.13 As discussed in greater detail below, subsequent legislation further eroded its
protections as well.
States remained free to legislate transfer schemes as they deemed fit until the mid1960s, when the U.S. Supreme Court established a constitutional floor for all transfer
hearings in Kent v. United States.1 4 In Kent, the Court invalidated the transfer of a sixteenyear-old juvenile to adult court on the ground that the juvenile court failed to hold a formal
hearing to determine whether transfer was appropriate. 15 While the "objectives [of the
juvenile court] are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and to
protect society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt, and punishment," the state's
position as parens patriae is "not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." 1 6 The Court
held that youth, like adults, are entitled to due process and fairness. 17 To satisfy the
demands of due process, a juvenile court judge must conduct a hearing during which the
juvenile is represented by counsel who has access to his social records, and a judge may
only enter an order waiving jurisdiction on the basis of a "full investigation." 18 In the event

12

Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909) (emphasis added).

13 ELIZABETH KOOY, ILL. JUV. JUST. INITIATIVE, CHANGING COURSE: A REVIEW OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS

OF DRUG TRANSFER REFORM IN ILLINOIS 7 (2008) [hereinafter KOOY, CHANGING COURSE],

http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/111 (noting that the first discretionary transfer occurred in
1903); see also L. Mara Dodge, "OurJuvenile Court Has Become More Like a Criminal Court":A
Century of Reform at the Cook County (Chicago) Juvenile Court, 26 MIcH. HIST. REV. 51, 57 (2000),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20173859?seq=1 (noting that the court's "first judge, Richard S. Tuthill,
transferred ten to twelve juveniles a year to adult criminal court").
" See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 554-55.
1" Id. at 562.
18 Id. at 561.
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the juvenile court determines transfer is appropriate, it must state on the record the reasons
for its conclusion so as to allow for meaningful appellate review. 19
Although the Court declined to announce a binding test of what constitutes a "full
investigation," it identified a list of factors that a juvenile court may consider in making a
transfer determination, as enumerated below:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditatedor willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons
especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United
States Attorney).

5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in
one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense
are adults who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophisticationand maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including
previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law
enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions,
prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to
juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitationof the juvenile (if he is
found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of
procedures, services and facilities currently available to the
Juvenile Court. 20
In the wake of Kent, states began amending their transfer statutes to adhere to the new
formal hearing requirements and to reflect incorporation of these eight factors, albeit
loosely. 21
19 Id.

Id. at 566-67 (emphasis added).
21 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6(d) (3d ed. 2020) (explaining that "a great
majority of states have adopted, either by statute or case law, some or all of the [Kent criteria]."); see also
KooY, CHANGING COURSE, supra note 13 (noting that the Illinois legislature amended its transfer scheme
to comply with the due process requirements under Kent in 1973).
20

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol41/iss2/4
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One year later, in the seminal case In re Gault, the Court extended the due process
protections afforded to juveniles to include the right to counsel, to confront witnesses, to
protect against self-incrimination, and to timely notification of the allegations pending
against them. 22 It thereafter determined in In re Winship and Breed v. Jones that the
standard of reasonable doubt and protections against double jeopardy also apply to juvenile
adjudications. 23 While these cases collectively gave juvenile proceedings the semblance of
adult court prosecutions, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the principle that
juveniles are entitled to different treatment. 24 In a series of decisions, for example, it ruled
that distinctions between juvenile and adult court proceedings justified the inapplicability
of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury and the imposition of special confidentiality
requirements. 25

By the early 1980s, however, states began to reverse course. 26 Juvenile crime
appeared to be escalating at an alarming rate; the number of juvenile arrests for violent
offenses between 1980 and 1994 increased by 64%.27 In response, states nationwide
lowered the age for exclusive jurisdiction, increased the number of eligible offenses for
transfer, and filed more delinquency petitions. 28 Illinois enacted its first mandatory transfer
statute in 1982, which allowed juveniles age fifteen and older to be automatically
prosecuted in adult court for murder, criminal sexual assault, and robbery with a firearm. 29
The legislature continued to broaden the mandatory transfer statute over the years,
expanding its applicability to nonviolent drug and weapon offenses, as well as to certain
serious crimes committed by thirteen and fourteen-year-olds. 30
As the perceived spike in juvenile crime continued into the 1990s, so did calls for
a "tough on crime" approach. However, the decade was fraught with inaccurate projections
of national crime trends and inflammatory rhetoric that proved to be effective forms of
propaganda. Between 1983 and 1995, the number of delinquency petitions filed in Illinois
22

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34, 41, 55, 57 (1967).

23

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 9, at 3, 7-8.

24

25 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that the right to trial by jury does not
apply to juvenile proceedings); see Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979) (recognizing
that "all 50 states have statutes that provide in some way for confidentiality"); see also People v. Patterson,
2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106 (explaining that access to juvenile courts is not a constitutional right because the
juvenile justice system is a "creature of legislation").
26 ISHIDA ET AL., supra note 4.
27 JEFFREY BUTTS & JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INST. JUST. POL'Y CTR, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN

YOUTH VIOLENCE: 1980 TO 2000, at 2 (2002), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/60381
/410437-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-American-Youth-Violence.PDF.
28 Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, JUV. JUST. BULL.,
June 2010, at 1, 1, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf; JEFFREY A. BUTTS ET AL., OFF. OF JUV.
JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1994, at 5 (1996),

https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/163709.pdf (noting that "[f]rom 1985 to 1994, the number of delinquency
cases processed by U.S. juvenile courts increased 41%").
29 Automatic Transfer History, JUV. JUST. INITIATIVE, https://jjustice.org/resources/juvenile-transfer-toadult-court/automatic-transfer-history/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).
30 ISHIDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-6, 9 (noting that mandatory transfer also applies to juveniles as young as
thirteen for the crime of first degree murder committed during the course of aggravated sexual assault,
criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnapping).
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rose by 59%, while the number of adult court transfers increased by over 1,424% from
1985 to 1994.31 Despite declining crime rates beginning in 1994, John J. Dilulio Jr., an
influential criminologist, warned the following year of an impending influx of violent
juvenile crime.32 He coined the term "superpredator" to describe the new type of juvenile
offender on the rise: youth who have "no respect for human life and no sense of the future,"
and who "kill and maim on impulse." 33 These "fatherless, Godless, and jobless" juveniles,
he contended, were the product of "moral poverty." 34 By weaving pejorative terminology
into the national discourse, false characterizations were weaponized against marginalized
communities, particularly Black men and boys. 35 After years of postulations that Black
males are morally bankrupt, it is unsurprising that Black youth, who were once labeled
incorrigible superpredators, comprise the majority of commitments to the Illinois
Department of Justice (IDJJ) and adult court transfers. 36
Similar-minded academics echoed Dilulio's prediction, opining that "[t]he overall
drop in crime hides the grim truth" and that the country will "likely face a future wave of
youth violence that will be even worse than that of the past ten years."3 7 Dilulio, who once
proclaimed that "[n]o one in academia is a bigger fan of incarceration" 3 8 than he, projected
that 6% of youth or approximately 270,000 juveniles-would become superpredators by
2010.39 According to his estimates, the country would "probably need to incarcerate at least
150,000 juvenile criminals in the years just ahead." 4 0 Media outlets and politicians widely

" Przybylski, supra note 7, at 5.

See Carroll Bogert & Lynnell Hancock, Superpredator:The Media Myth That Demonized a Generation
of Black Youth, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/11/20/
superpredator-the-media-myth-that-demonized-a-generation-of-black-youth.
33 John Dilulio, The Coming of the Super-Predators,WASH. EXAM'R (Nov. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Dilulio,
Super - Predators],https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-coming-of-the-superpredators.
34 John Dilulio, Fill Churches, Not Jails: Youth Crime and "Superpredators,"BROOKINGS (Feb. 28, 1996),
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/fill-churches-not-jails-youth-crime-and-superpredators/
(republishing Dilulio's statement submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee); see also John Dilulio,
Moral Poverty, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Dilulio, Moral Poverty] ("Moral poverty is the
poverty of being without loving, capable, responsible adults who teach you right from wrong. It is the
poverty of being without parents and other authorities who habituate you to feel joy at others' joy, pain at
others' pain, happiness when you do right, remorse when you do wrong. It is the poverty of growing up in
the virtual absence of people who teach morality by their own everyday example and who insist that you
follow suit.").
" See Bogert & Hancock, supra note 32 (describing the "superpredator" theory as a "racist trope" that
"began a process of allowing us to suspend our feelings of empathy towards young people of color").
36 See infra Part III.
32

37 JAMES ALAN FOX, TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDING 1 (1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/

tjvfox.pdf; see also Philip Yam, Profile: James Alan Fox, SCI. AM., Jun. 1996, at 40, 41.
38 Dilulio, Super- Predators,supra note 33.
39 JAMES C. HOWELL, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A COMPREHENSIVE

FRAMEWORK 4 (2d ed. 2013).
4' Dilulio, Moral Poverty, supra note 34.
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popularized Dilulio's commentary, prompting states to pass more legislation that allowed
for increased prosecution of juvenile crimes. 4 1
Consistent with national trends, Illinois created presumptive transfer as a third
avenue to adult court. 4 2 Under presumptive transfer, a transfer hearing must be held in
accordance with Kent, but unlike discretionary transfers, a finding of probable cause
creates a rebuttable presumption that the juvenile justice system is an improper forum. 43
The provision presumes that juvenile services are unsuitable for repeat juvenile offenders
who commit certain serious crimes. 44 Once the burden shifts, a juvenile may rebut this
presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence-a demanding standard to meet. 45
The juvenile bears the burden of proving amenability "to the care, treatment, and training
programs available" through the juvenile court by reference to a specified list of factors. 4 6
As the turn of the century neared and national juvenile crime rates continued to
steadily decline, Dilulio's earlier forecasts faced mounting skepticism. His predictions of
a "demographic time bomb" never materialized. 47 Not only did the overall juvenile crime
rate decline between 1994 and 2000, but juvenile arrests for murder and burglary dropped
by 68% and 51%, respectively. 4 8 In fact, the rate of violent juvenile crime by 2000 reached
its lowest rate since 1980.49
Juvenile justice organizations began reevaluating the efficacy of Illinois' punitive
policies in the mid to late 1990s, advocating for structural reform. 50 Illinois policymakers
acknowledged the growing demands for reform by passing the Illinois Juvenile Justice
Reform Act of 1998.51 It amended the purpose and policy statement of the Juvenile Court
Act to incorporate the principles of restorative justice, emphasizing the importance of
accountability, community safety, and competency development.5 2 Eight years later, the
legislature created the IDJJ as an independent agency charged with overseeing the
treatment and services of adjudicated youth. 53 Prior to this, the Illinois Department of
Corrections managed all juvenile detention facilities. 54 In more recent years, the state not
only increased the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to seventeen years for misdemeanors
Bogert & Hancock, supra note 32.
42 Safe Neighborhood Law, Pub. Act 88-680, 1995 11. Laws 107 (amending the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
to include presumptive transfers).
43 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-653).
44 Id. § 5-805(2).
45 Id. § 5-805(2)(b).
46 Id. § 5-805(2)(b).
47 Dilulio, Super- Predators,supra note 33; see Bogert & Hancock, supra note 32.
48 BUTTS & TRAVIS, supra note 27, at 4.
49 Id. at 3.
51 James R. Coldren Jr., Juvenile Justice Reform Takes Hold in Illinois, JUST. RES. & STAT. Ass'N (2006)
https://www.jrsa.org/pubs/forum/full-articles/juvenile-justice-reform.pdf.
41

51 BOSTWICK, supra note 2.
52

Id. at 1-2.

&

5 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-2.5-5 (West, Westlaw current through P.A. 101-673) (indicating an
effective date of June 1, 2006).
54
Child. & Fam. Just. Ctr., Restoring the State Legacy of Rehabilitationand Reform, 1 CMTY. SAFETY
FUTURE ILL.' YOUTH PRISONS, Jan. 2018, at 1, 3, https://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/cfjc/docu
ments/CFJC%20Youth%20Prison%20Brief%2OVol%201 %20FINAL.pdf.
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and felonies, but also reduced the population of youth in juvenile detention centers by 87%
since 1999.55
The state's transfer scheme, however, has withstood numerous constitutional
attacks waged against it over the years. 56 It remained unmarred until 2016, when the
legislature passed a bipartisan bill abolishing all mandatory transfers and limiting the scope
of presumptive transfers. 57 To prevail on a presumptive transfer petition under the revised
statute, the state must allege that: (1) the juvenile committed a forcible felony, 58 (2) the
juvenile was previously adjudicated or found guilty of a forcible felony, and (3) the instant
offense was "committed in furtherance of criminal activity by an organized gang." 59
Although it was the first bill of its kind to comprehensively reform the state's juvenile
transfer laws, it left the discretionary transfer provision fully intact. 60 Under this provision,
a juvenile court possesses the authority to transfer a juvenile as young as thirteen years old
to adult court for any offense, provided a Kent hearing is held.6 1
While adjudication in juvenile court "is not a matter of constitutional right," 62 the
very creation of the juvenile justice system evinces Illinois' intent to provide unique
protection for its most vulnerable youth. Consequently, "[i]f something about children
compels the existence of juvenile courts, the lack of symmetry between the irrebuttable
presumption of majority and the rebuttable presumption of minority should be
disturbing." 63 The state's discretionary transfer mechanism, in particular, confronts this
position.
Ill. Laws 3971; Pub. Act 98-61, 2013 Ill. Laws 1709; ILL. DEP'T OF JUV. JUST.,
2019 ANNUAL REPORT 1, https://www2.illinois.gov/idjj/Documents/IDJJ%2OAnnual%20Report%202019
.pdf (noting that 2,174 juveniles were held in detention centers in 1999, while 286 juveniles were detained
in 2019).
56 See People v. M.A., 529 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ill. 1988) (finding that the mandatory transfer of juveniles
charged with weapon offenses on school grounds does not violate due process guarantees); see People v.
R.L., 634 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ill. 1994) (holding that expansion of the mandatory transfer statute to minors
charged with committing drug offenses near public housing property does not violate equal protection); see
People v. Beltran, 327 765 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (concluding that Apprendi is not
implicated in presumptive transfers because such hearings are dispositional, not adjudicatory); see People
v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, 11 97, 106, 127 (rejecting due process and Eighth Amendment challenges to
the mandatory transfer statute).
57 Pub. Act 99-258, 2015 Ill. Laws 4718 (amending 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(1)(a), 5-805).
58 The following offenses constitute forcible felonies under Illinois law: "treason, first degree murder,
second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated
kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against
any individual." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-8 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-653).
59 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-653).
55 Pub. Act 95-1031, 2008

60
61

Id. § 5-805(3).
Id. § 5-805(3)(a).

People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669, ¶ 21; see also People v. Jiles, 251 N.E.2d 529, 530-31 (Ill. 1969)
(noting that "while it may be highly desirable to commit to the judge of a specialized juvenile court the
determination of whether or not a particular juvenile is to be prosecuted criminally, we are aware of no
constitutional requirement that a State must do so").
62

63 ABA & INST. OF JUD. ADMIN., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER

BETWEEN COURTS 3 (1980), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/82487.pdf.
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AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Criminal responsibility refers to the extent to which a person may be deemed
"answerable" for a criminal act. 64 With the exception of strict liability offenses, criminal
responsibility is a requisite for the imposition of criminal liability. 6 5 It is widely recognized
as being contingent upon the wrongdoer's ability to understand right from wrong. 66 While
the existence of such an ability may be easy to discern in mature adults, the same does not
hold true for children and adolescents.
Current discrepancies among states are illustrative; there is no consensus on the
precise age at which a juvenile is presumed to acquire this understanding. At present,
twenty-eight states-including Illinois-do not prescribe a minimum age for adjudication
in juvenile court. 67 Among the twenty-two states that do, thirteen set the minimum age at

64

Responsibility, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Orvill C. Snyder, CriminalResponsibility, 1962 DUKE L.J. 204, 204 (1962).
66 Id. at 208, 210.
65

67 ALA. CODE § 12-15-102 (Westlaw through Act 2021-238); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.12.022 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Ch. 1); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (West, Westlaw through 2021-2022
Sess. Ch. 18); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.03 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Ch. 6); GA. CODE. ANN. § 1511-2(10) (West, Westlaw through Laws 2021, Act 10); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-11 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 Sess., Act 7); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-105 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-3 of
2021 Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-502 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Ch.1-223, 225); IND. CODE.
ANN. § 31-37-1-1 (West, Westlaw through 2021 First Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.3 (West, Westlaw
through Apr. 12, 2021 legis.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.010 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 12, 2021
legis.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 3003 (Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Ch. 31); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2021, No. 8 of 2021 Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031
(West, Westlaw through 2021 First Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-103 (West, Westlaw through 2021
Sess. Chs. effective Apr. 11, 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:2 (Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-22 (West, Westlaw through 2021 legis. Ch. 47, J.R. No. 1); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A1-4 (West, Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Ch. 140 & 2021 First Special Sess. Ch. 4); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.011 (West, Westlaw through Files 1-4, 6-8 of 2021-2022 Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §
1-1-105 (Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Ch. 197); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419C.005 (West, Westlaw
through 2020 Sess.); 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Ch. 4); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 63-19-20 (Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 18); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 First Sess. Mar. 23, 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-105 (West, Westlaw through 2021
Sess. Apr. 30, 2021); VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-228 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess.); W. VA CODE ANN.
§ 49-4-701 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Mar. 25, 2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Apr. 21, 2021); see also In re Greene, 390 N.E.2d 884, 887 (Ill. 1979) ("We
hold that age is not an element which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support an
adjudication of delinquency. Delinquency is not a crime codified under our criminal laws. Rather, it is the
commission of an otherwise unlawful act by one under 17 that triggers the application of the Juvenile Court
Act. Age therefore is merely the factor which authorizes the application of the juvenile system." (internal
citations omitted)).
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ten years old, 68 while the lowest in the country-North Carolina-is set at six years old. 69
Although the lack of uniformity and extraordinarily low bounds for adjudication have
raised concerns on an international level, state legislatures have rebuffed calls for reform. 70
Similar variability is apparent in laws governing adult prosecution of youth. All
fifty states have mechanisms in place for adult court transfer, with some allowing
prosecution of children as young as ten years old. 71 While the majority has retreated from
mandatory or presumptive transfers, forty-four states continue to rely upon discretionary
transfer provisions. 72 Of these, thirteen states provide no minimum age for discretionary
68

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 8-307 (Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Apr. 20, 2021); ARK. CODE. ANN. §

9-27-303(15) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Act 564); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-104 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Apr. 26, 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2302(n) (West, Westlaw through
2021 Sess. Apr. 22, 2021 legis.); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 804(3) (Westlaw through 2020 Second
Extraordinary Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.14 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Apr. 27, 2021);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Apr. 20, 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 12.1-04-01 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Apr. 22, 2021); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6302 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Act 9); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8C-2 (Westlaw through 2021
Sess. Mar. 25, 2021); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 5102(2)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2021-2022 Sess. Acts 1-9, M-1) (but allowing for
adjudication of a minor regardless of age for the crime of murder); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.12 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Act 7).
69 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1501(7)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.).
70 Committee on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, General
Comment No. 24 (2019) on Children'sRights in the Child Justice System, U.N. Doc CRC/C/GC/24, at 6
(Sept. 18, 2019) ("States parties are encouraged to take note of recent scientific findings, and to increase
their minimum age accordingly, to at least 14 years of age. Moreover, the developmental and neuroscience
evidence indicates that adolescent brains continue to mature even beyond the teenage years, affecting
certain kinds of decision-making. Therefore, the Committee commends States parties that have a higher
minimum age, for instance 15 or 16 years of age, and urges States parties not to reduce the minimum age of
criminal responsibility under any circumstances .... ").
71 Griffin et al., supra note 5, at 2-4; e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45(7)(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2021
Sess.); e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1)(am) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186).
72 ALA. CODE § 12-15-203 (Westlaw through Act 2021-118); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.12.100 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Second Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327 (Westlaw through 2021 First Sess.);
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-318 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Act 151); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
707 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Ch. 9); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-518 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 First Sess. Ch. 7); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020
Sess.); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 921 (West, Westlaw through 2020-2021 Sess. Ch. 3); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
985.556 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-11-561 (West, Westlaw through 2020
Legis. Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-22 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
20-508 (West, Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Ch. 13); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3); IND.
CODE. ANN. § 31-30-3-6 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Feb. 23, 2021 legis.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347 (West, Westlaw through
2021 Sess. Jan. 25, 2021 legis.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.020 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Ch.
8); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 857 (Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101
(Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Ch. 20); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-06 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 Sess. Feb. 15, 2021 legis.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.4 (West, Westlaw through P.A.
2020, No. 402); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Feb. 13, 2021 legis.);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Feb. 8, 2021 legis.); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.071 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-203 (West, Westlaw through 2021
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transfer, opting instead to leave the criminal responsibility determination up to the court or
the prosecution. 73 Among those specifying an age, nineteen states fixed the minimum age
at fourteen years old, 74 while the lowest are set at twelve years old. 75 Illinois falls in the
middle; a child must be at least thirteen years of age to be eligible for transfer. 76 This pattern
of inconsistent line drawing across the country invites skepticism as to the rationale behind
these age determinations.
Unlike modern approaches to juvenile criminal responsibility, the common law
infancy defense epitomized the understanding that youthfulness may reduce, if not
completely absolve, a juvenile's culpability. By using age as a proxy for responsibility, the
infancy defense operated on the assumption that some youth, by virtue of their age, are
unable to "grasp the moral ramifications of their behavior." 77 This defense created a
presumption that children under seven years old are doli incapax, or "incapable of

Sess. Chs. effective Feb. 18, 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62B.390 (West, Westlaw through 2020
Special Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24 (Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:4A-26.1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess., Ch. 146, J.R. No. 6); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B2200 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-34 (West, Westlaw through
2021 Sess. Mar. 18, 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.10(B) (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020
Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419C.352 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6355 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Act 1); 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-7 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Second Sess. Ch. 79); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1210(4),(5),(9),(10) (Westlaw
through 2020 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Feb. 17, 2021); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (West, Westlaw through 2021 First Extraordinary Sess. Feb. 3, 2021); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-703.3 (West,
Westlaw through 2020 Sixth Special Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5204 (West, Westlaw through 20212022 Sess. Acts 1-2); VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess. cc. 1 & 2); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.110 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Ch. 5); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-710
(West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Mar. 16, 2021 legis.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Act 186); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.).
73 ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.100; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-22; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 20-509; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-06;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24; 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 14-1-7, 14-1-7.1; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
26-11-4; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.110; W. VA CODE ANN. § 49-4710; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237.
74 ALA. CODE § 12-15-203; ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-318; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1010; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 985.556; IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-30-3-2; IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.020; LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 857; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.4;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-34; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.10; 42
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355; S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1210; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-703.3; VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-269.1; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18.
75 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-518; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071; MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5204.
76 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3)(a).
?? Barbara Kaban & James Orlando, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense
in the ContemporaryJuvenile Court,
60 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 35 (2007); see also LAFAVE, supra note 21, at § 9.6a ("The early common
law infancy defense was based upon an unwillingness to punish those thought to be incapable of forming
criminal intent and not of an age where the threat of punishment could serve as a deterrent.").
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committing a crime." 78 The presumption also applied to those between the ages of seven
and fourteen, but was rebuttable upon a clear showing of evidence to the contrary. 79
Children over fourteen years, however, could be held responsible for their crimes, subject
to the state's ability to prove the required level of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 80
Although the infancy defense fits within, and in fact facilitates, the goals of the
juvenile justice system, courts across the country have almost uniformly rejected its
application to juvenile proceedings. 8 1 Some have concluded that the constitutional
protections instituted by the Supreme Court were sufficient in themselves to safeguard
against improper prosecution, while others have found that a juvenile court's focus should
be on the child's state of mind (mens rea), rather than on capacity. 82 Irrespective of the
precise reasoning behind each court's decision, rejection of the presumption of incapacity
necessarily allows for the impermissible inference that "young children are capable of
formulating a criminal intent and to use that inference, explicitly or implicitly, as a basis
for finding these children delinquent."83
As mentioned earlier, modern jurisprudence has reduced the criminal responsibility
inquiry into a sole right-versus-wrong distinction. By contrast, the infancy defense doubled
the state's burden by not only requiring proof that the child "had discretion to judge
between good and evil," but also strong evidence demonstrating that "he understoodwhat
he did." 84 Proof of the latter element commands that the child could "appreciate the nature
and consequences of his actions."8 5 If a child is unable to fully comprehend the gravity and
irreversibility of his actions, then he could not have intended the outcome in a manner
consistent with the mental state required by the charged offense. In other words, the defense
negates the need for inquiry into mens rea because it presumes children are incapable of
forming it in the first place.
While the presumption of incapacity extended only to juveniles below the age of
fourteen, its underlying reasoning is illustrative of how the state's discretionary transfer
provision oversimplifies the criminal responsibility analysis. By allowing a child as young
as thirteen to be transferred to adult court, the provision not only assumes the child's ability
to form the required mens rea to be adjudicated a delinquent, but also that the child can in
fact form the identical mens rea as his adult counterpart. Cognitive research on juvenile
78 Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the SuperpredatorMyth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent'sBest Defense in
Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 159, 162 (2000) (citing SIR MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORIA PLACITORUM
CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 18-19 (1736)); Doli incapax, BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
79 SIR MATTHEW HALE,

1

HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN

26-27 (1736); LAFAVE, supra note 21, at § 9.6a.
80 See HALE, supra note 79, at 18; see also Kaban & Orlando, supra note 77, at 36.
81 Bazelon, supra note 78, at 161; but see, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-05 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 Sess. Apr. 13, 2021) (recognizing a presumption of incapacity as a result of infancy for
children younger than seven years old); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.050 (West, Westlaw through
2021 Sess. Ch. 82) (applying a presumption of incapacity to children twelve years and younger, but noting
that the presumption is rebuttable with respect to those between the ages of eight and twelve years old).
82 Bazelon, supra note 78.
83 Id.

84 Id. at 169; HALE, supra note 79, at 27.
85

Bazelon, supra note 78, at 169.
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brain function has effectively undermined both of these assertions. 86 Brain development
during adolescence is highly dynamic; structural and neurobiological changes result in
increased impulsivity, risk-taking, emotional instability, and vulnerability to peer
influence. 87 Studies confirm that, on average, the prefrontal cortex does not fully mature
until age twenty-five. 88 Escalation of delinquent behavior between the ages of twelve and
seventeen is well-documented both domestically 89 and internationally. 9 0 Criminologists
refer to this phenomenon as the "age-crime curve" because delinquency typically increases
during adolescence and peaks at about seventeen years of age, before decreasing in
adulthood. 9 1 Indeed, the majority of IDJJ commitments in 2018 involved youth between
the ages of fourteen and seventeen, with the latter retaining the highest detention rate at
16.8 per 1,000 juveniles. 92
Understanding normative distinctions between right and wrong is distinguishable
from appreciating the ramifications of criminal behavior. Without fully-developed faculties
governing foresight of risks and consequences, emotional reactivity, or objective judgment,
juveniles are inherently less culpable than their adult counterparts. It is counterproductive
to rely on age alone to determine capacity; the court must also view juvenile criminal
responsibility in the context of cognitive development and social environment.
At present, no comparable defense to the common law incapacity presumption
exists. Assuming that some youth between the ages of thirteen and seventeen are suitable
for adult court prosecution compromises the state's intent to provide special protection for
its youth. Contemporary understandings of culpability command a paternalistic and
rehabilitative approach to juvenile justice.

See Jenny E. Carrol, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539, 591
(2016) (arguing that "[fjor the mens rea element to serve its designated role in the criminal justice process
as the measure of guilt, it must reflect the mental state, with all its comparative cognitive deficiencies, of
the adolescent it considers"); see also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1010-16 (2003) (discussing findings from studies on adolescent brain development and
arguing that " the developmental immaturity of adolescence mitigates culpability").
87 Alexandra O. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of Developmental
Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 63, 63-65 (2014),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.11.002.
88 Mariam Arain et al., Maturationof The Adolescent Brain, 2013 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE
TREATMENT 449, 451, https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S39776 (discussing the neurobiological changes
underlying brain maturation during adolescence).
89 Cohen & Casey, supra note 87, at 63-64.
90 See, e.g., Susan McVie, Patterns of Deviance Underlying the Age-Crime Curve: The Long Term
&

86

Evidence, 7 PAPERS FROM 2004 BRITISH CRIMINOLOGY CONF., at 1, 1-2,

https://www.britsoccrim.org/volume-7/.
91 Cohen & Casey, supra note 87, at 63.
92 ILL. JUV. JUST. COMM'N, ILLINOIS JUVENILE DETENTION DATA REPORT. CALENDAR YEAR 2018, at 23
(2020) [hereinafter IJJC, JUVENILE DETENTION DATA REPORT],

http://ijjc.illinois.gov/sites/ijjc.illinois.gov/files/assets/IJJC%20CY%202018%2OAnnual%20Illinois%2OJu
venile%20Detention%2OData%2OReport%2OFinal.pdf.
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THE DOWNFALLS OF DISCRETION: IMPLICIT BIAS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The provision's central flaw is evident in its name-discretionarytransfer. Once
an assistant state's attorney elects to file a petition, the final transfer determination remains
within the sole discretion of the court. 93 While affording broad discretion ensures that these
decision-making processes are not unduly hindered by inflexible standards, neither
prosecutors nor judges are immune from implicit bias. 94 Assuming otherwise ignores the
realities of neurobiology and the prison industrial complex. As the amount of discretion
accorded increases, so does the potential for abuse. Unfortunately, the impacts of broad
discretion-and the opportunities it affords for bias and abuse-are disproportionately
borne by youth of color.
Black youth are overrepresented both in the juvenile justice system as a whole and
in transfer decisions. 95 Although Black youth represent only one-fifth of the youth
population of Illinois, they comprise 85% of youth in the juvenile justice system.96
Disproportionate contact is apparent at all stages; Black youth are substantially more likely
than white youth to be arrested, detained, and committed to the IDJJ. 97 Despite steady
decreases in the number of youth in IDJJ custody in recent years, the remaining population
is 71% youth of color.9 8 Due to incomplete and inconsistent reporting, however, data
collection on transfers remains nominal. 99 Nevertheless, available information reveals
"stark patterns" of racial and ethnic disparities in adult court transfers. 100 From 1975 to
1981, 68% of youth discretionally transferred each year were Black. 10 1
While these disparities are a symptom of systemic racism and cannot be reduced to
a simple causal relationship, the impact of implicit bias on official decision-making should
not be overlooked. As opposed to overt forms of racism, implicit bias operates discretely

93 KOOY, CHANGING COURSE, supra note 13, at 7.
94 Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL. BAR J. 40, 40 (2014).
95 IJJC, JUVENILE DETENTION DATA REPORT, supra note 92, at 11-12; FY20 Illinois Juvenile Justice
Commission Annual Report, ILL. DEP'T OF HUM. SERVS.,

http://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=133072 (last visited May 16, 2021).
96 Leah Varjacques, Looking Back and Casting Forward:An Emerging Shift for Juvenile Justice in
America, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Jan. 16, 2013), https://jjie.org/2013/01/16/looking-back-castingforward-emerging-shift-for-juvenile-justice-america/.
97 ILL. JUV. JUST. COMM'N, DMC: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE ASSESSMENT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN ILLINOIS' JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), http://ijjc.illinois.gov/sites/ijjc.illinois.gov

/files/assets/DMC%20in%20the%20IL%20Juvenile%20Justice%20System%20-%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
98 ILL. DEP'T OF JUV. JUST., supra note 55, at 1-2 (indicating that out of 289 juveniles detained in IDJJ
facilities in 2019, 205 were Black).
99 ILL. JUV. JUST. RSCH. & INFO. CONSORTIUM, TRANSFER DATA IN ILLINOIS: GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1

(2014), http://ijjc.illinois.gov/sites/ijjc.illinois.gov/files/assets/BRIEFING%20SERIES%20%20TRANSFER%20DATA.pdf.
100 Id.
101 ELIZABETH KOOY, JUV. JUST. INITIATIVE, WHEN JUVENILE COURT IS THE DEFAULT STARTING PLACE
FOR YOUTH: A REVIEW OF OUTCOMES FOLLOWING 2015 AUTOMATIC TRANSFER CHANGES IN COOK
COUNTY 8 (2020) [hereinafter KOOY, WHEN JUVENILE COURT IS THE DEFAULT] https://jjustice.org/wp-

content/uploads/Transfer-Report-2020.pdf; see also ISHIDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 10.
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within the subconscious.1 0 2 Its hidden nature renders it particularly insidious; it is "a kind
of distorting lens that's a product of both the architecture of our brain and the disparities in
our society." 103 The human brain is hardwired for efficiency. 104 It uses mental shortcuts, or
heuristics, to categorize perceptions and allow for quick inferences. 105 These shortcuts,
however, create a framework for harboring biases that influence judicial outcomes. 106
Studies have confirmed that legal actors, much like the general public, have biases
that create harmful generalizations and perpetuate stereotypes. 107 There is evidence that
prosecutors are more likely to file charges against Black suspects 108 and are less likely to
reduce charges during plea negotiations. 109 Judges, who are ordinarily "revered as the
pinnacle of objectivity," likewise hold unconscious beliefs that result in unfair treatment
and disproportionate punishment.1 10 These outcomes have been attributed to a variety of
theories, including proclivities to recall case facts in racially-biased ways 1 1 1 and to
associate Black individuals with aggression, criminality, and weapons.1 1 2 Empirical
research suggests that justice system stakeholders tend to attribute more negative
characteristics to Black adults and youth than to their white counterparts.11 3
Such assumptions may impact prosecutorial discretion at every phase, from
deciding whether to charge a juvenile and what charges to bring, to deciding whether to
file a transfer petition. 1 4 These determinations require selecting a theory of guilt,
evaluating the materiality of evidence for exculpatory disclosure, and ascertaining the

102 JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE
THAT SHAPES WHAT WE SEE,

THINK, AND DO 32 (2019).
103 Id. at
6.
104 Id. at 24.
105 Eyal Peer & Eyal Gamliel, Heuristics and Biases in Judicial
Decisions, 49 J. AM. JUDGES ASS'N 114,
114 (2013), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1428&context=ajacourtreview.
106 Id
107 Hyman, supra, note
94.
108 Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the
Exercise of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 806 (2012).
109 Research Finds Evidence of Racial Bias in Plea Deals,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://eji.org/news/research-finds-racial-disparities-in-plea-deals/ (citing Carlos Berdej6, Criminalizing
Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C.L. REV. 1187 (2018)).
110 Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of JudicialStereotypes, 69
FLA. L. REV. 63, 63, 110 (2017), https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1345&context

=fir.

1 Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57
DUKE L.J. 345, 376-79 (2007), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1336&context
=dlj.
112 Sean Darling-Hammond, Designedto Fail:Implicit Bias in Our Nation's Juvenile Courts, 21 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 169, 181-83 (2017).
113 ZENOBIA BELL & ANA RASQUIZA, NAT'L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, IMPLICIT BIAS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE:

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 3, 7 (2014), https://youthlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ImplicitBias-Juvenile-Justice-Lit-Review-for-ncyl-web3.pdf.
114 Smith & Levinson, supra note 108, at 805.
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relative viability of potential defenses-all of which necessarily entail subjective
judgments.11 5
Of course, each decision by the prosecutor must then be countered by defense
counsel, who is most likely a state-appointed public defender faced with an onerous
workload.' 16 Zealous advocacy requires time to investigate, gather evidence, and prepare
witnesses to testify at the transfer hearing. 11 7 But public defenders are "forced by

circumstances to engage in triage"-that is "determining which clients merit attention and
which do not." 11 8 In absence of objective triage standards, implicit bias may influence the
underlying rationales for these decisions. 119 From evaluating ambiguous evidence to
determining acceptable sentences, decision-making by public defenders involves a wide
degree of discretion and subjective assessment, which in turn can contribute to their own
biases.120

Studies indicate that the preconceived perceptions of probation officers also impact
assessments of appropriate punishment. 121 Probation officers have been found to attribute
juvenile crime to internal, negative personality traits of Black youth, but to focus on
external, environmental influences when white youth are involved, even after accounting
for the severity of the offense and prior history of adjudication. 122 Implicit bias can also be
subliminally primed.1 23 One study, for example, discovered that police officers and
juvenile probation officers who were primed with race-related terms ascribed more
negative traits, greater culpability, and increased likelihood of recidivism to two
hypothetical youth suspects. 124 In turn, both groups categorically endorsed harsher
punishments. 125 Notably, the study further revealed that the participants viewed Black
youth as being less vulnerable and impressionable. 126 This type of association presents
Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1603-09 (2006),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1232&context=wmlr.
116 L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE
L.J. 2626, 2632 (2013), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1199_pzeey4tl.pdf.
115

"7 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt 1 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2019).
1. Richardson & Goff, supra note 116 (explaining that for most public defenders, "the question is not 'how

do I engage in zealous and effective advocacy,' but rather, 'given that all my clients deserve aggressive
advocacy, how do I choose among them?"').
119 Id. at 2632-34, 2644-45.
120 Id. at 2635, 2641.
121 E.g., George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparitiesin Official Assessments of Juvenile Offenders:
AttributionalStereotypes as MediatingMechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REv. 554, 557, 567 (1998),
https://doi.org/10.2307/2657267 (using 233 narrative reports written by probation officers to evaluate the
link between race and the officers' perceptions of juvenile offenders).
122 Id. at 561, 563-64.
123 Hyman, supra note 94, at 41 ("Priming is the 'incidental activation of knowledge
structures, such as trait
concepts and stereotypes, by the current situational context."' (quoting John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of
Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY

& Soc.

PSYCH.

230, 230 (1996))).

Sarah Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent
Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 483, 499 (2004).
125 Id. at 493.
126 Id. at 500.
124

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol41/iss2/4

16

Pijon: Youth in Adult Court: Rethinking Illinois' Use of Discretionary T

151

Children'sLegal Rights Journal

[Vol. 41:2

grave implications for Black youth in general, and particularly for Black juvenile offenders,
as it "trigger[s] the belief that they are adult-like and therefore as blameworthy as adults
who commit similar crimes. "127 The tendency to overlook developmental immaturity in
nonwhite offenders may indeed be outcome determinative; the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office and the Juvenile Probation and Court Services Department often work
hand in hand to conduct intake screenings during which the decision is made to charge,
divert, or transfer the juvenile to adult court. 12 8
Significantly, the language of the discretionary transfer provision renders the
transfer determination an exceedingly subjective process. A juvenile court faced with a
discretionary transfer petition must engage in a twofold inquiry. 129 First, it must consider
an enumerated list of factors set forth by statute. 130 Second, the court must decide whether
it is "not in the best interests of the public" to proceed in juvenile court with reference to
the preceding factors. 13 1 So long as probable cause exists to believe the allegations are true,
the juvenile court may allow for prosecution under criminal laws. 132 Probable cause, under
its ordinary meaning in the criminal context, exists when there is a reasonable ground to
believe that a person has committed a crime. 133 This standard affords a wide degree of
flexibility, rendering it a precarious threshold in practice. It speaks merely to the
"probability of criminal activity" and does not require that such probability "be more likely
than not." 13 4 The Juvenile Court Act does not provide a definition of probable cause
specific to the context of juvenile delinquency, let alone adult court transfer hearings.
The Illinois legislature developed this evaluation process to comport with the
individualized-hearing requirement imposed by Kent.13 5 The weight accorded to each
factor, however, ultimately undermines any notion of fundamental fairness. The statute
directs juvenile courts to give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and
the juvenile's prior record of delinquency than to other factors listed in the subsection,
including: (1) the age of the minor; (2) any previous abuse or neglect, mental health, or
educational history; (3) the advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system; (4)
the minor's willingness to participate meaningfully in available services; and (5) the
likelihood of rehabilitation. 136 It also requires courts to prioritize the safety of the public
over the juvenile's overall amenability to treatment.13 7 By shifting the focus away from
pertinent mitigating factors and tipping the scale in favor of adult prosecution, the
discretionary transfer provision dilutes the protections of juvenile jurisdiction.
Evaluations of a juvenile's likelihood for recidivism and rehabilitation are complex
determinations that require thorough individualized assessments, but often must be
127 Id.

BOSTWICK, supra note 2, at 11.
129 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3).
130 Id. § 5-805(3)(b).
131 Id. § 5-805(3)(a).
128

132 Id.

133 ProbableCause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
134 People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, 119.
135 ISHIDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
136

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3)(b).
§ 405/5-805(3)(a).

137 Id.
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conducted under time constraints and the pressure of a crowded docket. In Cook County,
cases are assigned to juvenile court judges according to the police district in which the
charged juvenile resides. 13 8 Generally speaking, the higher the crime rate for a particular
neighborhood, the higher the caseload for that courtroom. As a result of broader social
inequities and racially restrictive policies, 139 violent crime tends to be concentrated in
communities of color. 140

In conducting an individualized assessment pursuant to Kent, the court may
consider a variety of information including social records, psychological evaluations,
letters to the court, and the probation office's disposition recommendations. 14 1 These
materials help to compose a holistic picture of the juvenile's life in relation to the charged
offense, but deducing a juvenile's prospects for amenability and recidivism necessarily
entails subjective predictions of risk. Each judgment centers on "the likelihood of particular
outcomes in response to certain conditions that might be imposed by the court."142
The statutory inquiry also places more weight on the interests of the public, rather
than those of the juvenile. If a court determines that it would not be in the best interests of
the public to proceed with juvenile adjudication, it may enter an order for transfer to adult
court. 143 While protection of the public is undoubtedly a compelling state interest, this

element appears to be a remnant of earlier societal perceptions that being tough on juvenile
crime is an effective means of reducing and preventing crime. This strategy, however,
incorrectly conflates criminal punishment with public safety. Studies indicate that transfer
fails to serve as effective means for either general or specific deterrence. 144 On the contrary,
transfer and incarceration have been shown to exacerbate recidivism rates. 145 Transferred
youth-particularly those charged with violent offenses-reoffend sooner and with more
serious crimes. 146

This information is in the possession of the author.
139 See Alana Semuels, Chicago 's Awful Divide, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/03/chicago-segregation-poverty/556649/.
138

140 CITY OF CHI., OUR CITY, OUR SAFETY: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO REDUCE VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO

8

(2020), https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/sites/public-safety-and-violencreduction/pdfs/OurCityOurSafety.pdf.
141 SHOBHA L. MAHADEV, CHILD. & FAM. JUST. CTR. & NAT'L JUV. DEF. CTR., THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE

DEFENDER PRACTICE HANDBOOK 41, 137-38, 150 (2008), https://www.njjn.org/uploads/digitallibrary/The_Illinois_Juvenile_Defender_Practice_Notebook_NJDC_2008.pdf; Guide to Juvenile Court,
LAW OFF. OF THE COOK CNTY. PUB. DEF., https://www.cookcountypublicdefender.org/resources/guidejuvenile-court (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
142 Edward P. Mulvey & Anne-Marie R. Iselin, Improving ProfessionalJudgments of Risk andAmenability
in Juvenile Justice, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD., 35, 38 (2008).
143 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3)(a).
144 Redding, supra note 28, at 1, 2-4.
145 Id. at 4.
146 Id. at 6; see also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., THE CONSEQUENCES AREN'T MINOR: THE IMPACT OF
TRYING YOUTH AS ADULTS AND STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 14 (2007),

http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-03_C4YJConsequences_JJ.pdf.
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ADULT COURT PUNISHMENT

A. The Case for Reverse Waiver
Commit an adult crime, serve adult time. Once juvenile court jurisdiction is waived,
the youth's course is set; Illinois provides no recourse for a counter-transfer, or "reverse
waiver," by the receiving adult court. 147 Reverse waiver statutes permit juveniles to
challenge the adult court's jurisdiction. 14 8 If a juvenile's petition is granted, the adult court
will transfer the case to juvenile court for proper disposition. 149
States are split evenly on the issue of reverse waiver. 150 Most commonly, states
with reverse waiver provide recourse only for juveniles against whom the charges
originated in criminal court. 15 1 Opponents, however, contend that this type of provision
conflicts with the juvenile justice system because it operates on the presumption that adult
courts may exercise jurisdiction over minors unless affirmatively challenged. 152 Rather,
waiver mechanisms should "institutionalize a presumption in favor of juvenile court
jurisdiction." 53 In other words, a juvenile ought to automatically fall under the authority
of the juvenile system.
Only a few states allow reverse waiver in cases where charges were initiated in
juvenile court and transferred after a hearing. 154 Advocates argue that waiver provisions
are necessary safeguards from unwarranted criminal prosecution, while critics assert that
they allow for an adult court to arbitrarily override the determination of a juvenile court
judge, who has the knowledge and experience necessary to make these decisions. 155
There is considerable variation in the application of standards among states with
reverse waiver provisions. Some require the contesting juvenile to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that waiver is in the best interests of the public or child, 156
while others demand this showing by clear and convincing evidence1 5 7 or do not prescribe
a particular burden at all. 158
147 ISHIDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.

148 PATRICK GRIFFIN, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS
OF

JUVENILE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 1 (2008),

http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/181.
149 Id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
151 Id. at 20.
152 Id. at 21.
10

153

Id.

154 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 46b-127(g) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Mar. 31, 2021);

§ 43-21-157(8) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Apr. 20, 2021); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 62B.390(5) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Apr. 21, 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-159(e)(1)
MISS. CODE ANN.

(West, Westlaw through 2021 First Sess. Apr. 7, 2021).
155 ABA & INSTIT. OF JUD. ADMIN., supra note 63, at 20-21.
156 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-202(b)(3) (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Apr. 13,
2021); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6322 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess. Act 10).
157 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.183 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Act 19).
158 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-517 (West, Westlaw through 2021 First Sess.
May 4, 2021);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1011(b) (West, Westlaw through 2021-2022 Sess. Ch. 18).
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In absence of a reverse waiver mechanism in Illinois, a reversal of transfer is
warranted solely if an appellate court determines that the juvenile court's transfer
constituted an abuse of discretion, 15 9 which occurs only when the decision was "arbitrary,
fanciful or unreasonable or where no reasonable man would" accept the court's view. 160
For such a finding, the record ought to reflect that the juvenile court gave "virtually no
consideration" to the statutory factors.1 6 1
Illinois, like most states, does not allow for immediate review of transfer
determinations, because transfer orders are not final judgments and therefore are not
appealable. 162 The contesting juvenile must instead wait until a final judgment is entered
by the adult court. This is of particular concern in jurisdictions that are backlogged and
processing high volumes of cases. Cook County is home to "one of the largest unified court
systems in the world," 163 with tens of thousands of criminal cases on the docket at any
given time. Just over 22,000 new felony petitions were filed in 2019 alone. 164 That same
year, the clearance rate for all criminal cases only reached roughly 60%.165 Slow rates of
resolutions are apparent in all types of cases but tend to be most prevalent among serious,
violent offenses. 166 For example, the average disposition of armed robbery cases is
approximately 1.65 years, 167 while murders can take up to three to five years. 16 8
Unsurprisingly, reversals are few and far between.
Importantly, following a juvenile's transfer and conviction, the adult criminal court
retains original jurisdiction for any future offenses. 169 Regardless of how trivial a
subsequent encounter with the law may be, a transferred juvenile will never have the
People v. Chapai, 2011 IL App (3d) 090719, ¶ 15.
People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813, 842-43 (Ill. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).
161 People v. Clark, 518 N.E.2d 138, 146 (Ill. 1987). The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
and remanded
for a new discretionary transfer hearing, noting that "the mere recitation in the record that all statutory
factors have been considered is not enough to affirm an order transferring a minor to criminal court. Rather,
there must be sufficient evidence in the record as to each statutory factor to support the transfer order." Id.
at 145, 147.
162 See People v. Jiles, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1969) ("To permit interlocutory review of such an order
would obviously delay the prosecution of any proceeding in either the juvenile or the criminal division,
with the result that the prospect of a just disposition would be jeopardized. In either proceeding the primary
issue is the ascertainment of the innocence or guilt of the person charged. To permit interlocutory review
would subordinate that primary issue and defer its consideration.")
163 Organizationof the Circuit Court, STATE OF ILL., CIR. CT. OF COOK CNTY.,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUT-THE-COURT/Organization-of-the-Circuit-Court (last visited
May 16, 2021).
159
160

164 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE ILL. CTS., ILLINOIS COURTS: 2019 STATISTICAL SUMMARY 58 (2020),

https://courts.illinois.gov/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2020/2019_Statistical_Summary.pdf.
165 Id. at 29.
166 See State's Attorney Felony Cases - Average Case Length and Sum of Length, by Offense
Type, COOK
CNTY. STATE'S ATT'Y OFF. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://datacatalog.cookcountyil.gov/Courts/State-s-AttorneyFelony-Cases-Average-Case-Length-/wvbp-urjp.
167 Id. (defining the average case length as the number of days between initiation and
sentencing).
168 Frank Main, CriminalCases Drag onfor Years as Some
Cook County Judges OK Repeated Delays,
CHI. SUN TIMES (Oct. 9, 2020), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/10/9/21507537/delayed-justice-cookcounty-judges-continuances-tom-dart.
169 BOSTWICK, supra note 2,
at 25.
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opportunity for juvenile court adjudication again. 170 This "once an adult, always an adult"
mentality not only opens the door for arbitrary application, but it also thwarts the goals of
the juvenile justice system by ignoring the value and malleability of youth.
B. Unwarranted Sentences
The irreversibility of transfer decisions carries grave implications for a juvenile's
future. Without the shield of juvenile court jurisdiction, a juvenile in adult court is subject
to harsher sentences under the state criminal code. Unlike juvenile adjudication, in which
the maximum punishment entails confinement in a juvenile detention center until the age
of twenty-one, 17 1 Illinois' sentencing provisions typically carry extensive mandatory
minimums1 72 and enhancements. 173 In fact, Illinois boasts the most severe mandatory
firearm enhancements in the country. 174 Adult courts simply lack adequate safeguards to
protect transferred juveniles from unduly long terms of incarceration.
Apart from federal protections barring life imprisonment, 175 Illinois imposes only
two limitations on an adult court's sentence determination for juvenile offenders. The adult
court must first take into account a delineated list of mitigating factors when fashioning an
appropriate sentence for a juvenile. 176 The scheme also provides that a court, in its
discretion, may decline to impose otherwise applicable sentencing enhancements. 177 The
legislature enacted this new sentencing scheme in response to Miller, a U.S. Supreme Court

Id. at 7.
Id. at 20.
172 See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-20 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-4
of 2021 Sess.)
(mandating a minimum twenty-year sentence for first degree murder); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/402
(West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-4 of the 2021 Sess.) (requiring mandatory minimums of four, six, eight,
or ten years for the possession of controlled substances depending upon the amount in grams possessed);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1.1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-4 of the 2021 Sess.) (imposing a
mandatory two-year sentence for a first offense of unauthorized use of a weapon by a felon).
173 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-3.2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-4 of 2021 Sess.) (providing
for extended terms of incarceration where certain aggravating factors are present or where the charged
individual is convicted of a felony after conviction of the same, similar, or greater class of felony within the
last ten years); see also Know More: FirearmSentence Enhancements, RESTORE JUST.,
https://restorejustice.org/about-us/resources/know-more/know-more-firearm-sentence-enhancements/ (last
visited May 17, 2021) (explaining that judges must add a ten, twenty, or twenty-five year sentence
enhancement for the possession or discharge of a firearm during the commission of certain offenses).
174 Know More: FirearmSentence Enhancements, supra
note 173.
175 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79, 82 (2010) (holding that a sentence of life without
parole for a
nonhomicidal crime violates the Eighth Amendment); see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012)
(determining that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility for juveniles violate the Eighth
Amendment).
176 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-4 of 2021 Sess.) (listing
mitigating considerations including, but not limited to: the juvenile's age, level of maturity, and ability to
consider risks and consequences of behavior; the influence of outside pressure; the juvenile's home
environment and any childhood trauma; and the circumstances of the offense).
177 Id. § 5-4.5-105(b)-(c).
170
171
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decision holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 178
The state's highest court crafted the second sentencing limitation for transferred
juvenile offenders when it extended Miller's holding to de facto life sentences in People v.
Reyes. 179 It declined to provide an exact definition but noted that punishment amounts to a
de facto life sentence if it has the "same practical effect on a juvenile defendant's life as
would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole-in either situation, the juvenile
will die in prison."180 The court resolved this ambiguity three years later in People v. Buffer,
when it held that a prison sentence exceeding forty years effectively imposes a defacto life
sentence.181

While in theory these limitations encourage sentence determinations that
adequately reflect the mitigating circumstances of a juvenile's youth, their practical effect
depends largely upon the judge's discretion. As illustrated earlier, this discretion possesses
its own inherent challenges. Judges remain free to, and indeed still do, impose considerable
sentences of up to thirty-nine years of incarceration on juvenile offenders. 1 2 Even
assuming arguendo that the sentencing court conducted an in-depth evaluation into each
mitigating factor, its determination nevertheless remains subject to a variety of mandatory
minimums, the judge's own inclinations, and the ability of defense counsel to thoroughly
obtain the information needed to advance favorable and viable arguments.
Regardless of how much mercy a given judge is willing to spare, sentencing
disparities between juvenile and adult courts effectively nullify any grant of leniency. In
2017, for example, armed robbery was the second most common offense subject to transfer
petitions, just behind first degree murder. 183 Under the Illinois criminal code, armed
robbery is classified as a Class X felony, which mandates a sentence of incarceration
between six and thirty years. 184 If a firearm is possessed during the commission of the
offense, a fifteen-year enhancement must be added, producing a total sentencing range of
twenty-one to forty-five years of incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. 185
Under the new sentencing scheme and Buffer, a juvenile charged with armed robbery
therefore must serve at least six years in prison, with a maximum of forty years. 18 6 On the
178 Pub. Act. 99-69, 2015 11. Laws 954 (adding 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105); People
v. Harris, 2016
IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 59 (noting that "[i]n response to Miller, Illinois enacted a new sentencing scheme
for juveniles").
179 People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10.
180
Id.19.
181 People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327,
1 40.
182 See People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 1 (reducing a defendant's sentence to twenty-five
years of incarceration after the trial court, pursuant to Buffer, resentenced him to a just-below threshold
sentence of thirty-nine years for a murderhe committed at the age of sixteen); State 's Attorney Felony
Cases - Sentencing, COOK CNTY. STATE'S ATT'Y OFF. (May 10, 2021),
https://datacatalog.cookcountyil.gov/Courts/Sentencing/tg8v-tm6u.

183 ILL. JUV. JUST. COMM'N, TRIAL AND SENTENCING OF YOUTH AS ADULTS IN THE ILLINOIS JUSTICE
SYSTEM: TRANSFER DATA REPORT, at 16 (Mar. 2020).
184 720 ILL. COMP.
COMP. STAT. ANN.
185 720 ILL. COMP.
186 730 ILL. COMP.

STAT. ANN. 5/18-2(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-4 of 2021 Sess.); 730 ILL.
5/5-4.5-25(a) (West, Westlaw through 102-4 of 2021 Sess.).
STAT. ANN. 5/18-2; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-25(a).
STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-25(a), 5-4.5-105(c); see People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, 1 40.
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contrary, a juvenile court could only impose a sentence ranging from probation to
commitment in the IDJJ until the juvenile's twenty-first birthday. 18 7
This disproportional punishment is precisely what proponents of transfer laws
argue in support of their position. Transfer provisions, as well as the adult carceral system
itself, operate in part on the assumption that imposing harsh criminal sentences serves as
an effective deterrence. Increasing evidence, however, undermines this proposition. Adult
court prosecution is simply counterproductive. Although national data on juvenile
recidivism rates is lacking, comprehensive studies conducted at the state level are
indicative of broader trends. An examination of Florida's transfer laws, for example,
revealed that transferred juveniles recidivated at a significantly higher rate than those who
remained within the juvenile justice system. 188 This held true within all classes of offenses
involved and despite longer periods of incarceration. 189 Other large-scale studies conducted
in New York, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and New Jersey likewise exhibited similar
consequences: criminal court prosecution substantially increases the probability of
reoffending, even when probation is the only sentence imposed. 190 Strikingly,
Pennsylvania data indicated that transfer "was associated with a 77% greater likelihood of
violent felony arrest following completion of" the adult court sentence. 191 Together, these
four studies demonstrate an average increase of 34% in recidivism for transferredjuveniles
compared to retained youth, effectively undermining the idea that harsher punishment
deters juvenile crime. 192
C. Collateral Consequences
Unlike a delinquency disposition in juvenile court, a criminal conviction is a
permanent blemish on the juvenile's record because the vast majority of felony convictions
are ineligible for expungement under Illinois law. 193 A single conviction, in effect, serves
as a barrier to the juvenile's ability to obtain gainful employment, receive federal financial
aid, and find housing upon release. 194 These obstacles are further compounded by the
consequences of incarceration itself: removal from one's community, irregular contact
with family and friends, and disruption in education, as well as other negative impacts.

BOSTWICK, supra note 2, at 18, 21.
Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to CriminalCourt: Does It Make a Difference? 42
CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 176, 183 (1996) (analyzing the recidivism of 2,738 juveniles in Florida who were
transferred to criminal court in 1987).
189 Id. at 183.
190 Redding, supra note 28,
at 6.
191 Robert Hahn et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitatingthe Transfer of
Youth from the
Juvenile to the Adult Justice System: A Report on Recommendations of the Task Force on Community
Preventive Services, 56 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Nov. 2007, at 1, 7,
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5609.pdf.
187
188

192 Id.
193

194

20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 102-3 of 2021 Sess.).
KOOY, CHANGING COURSE, supra note 13, at 7; MAHADEV, supra note 140, at 148-49.
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To date, approximately 45,000 collateral consequences of conviction have been
identified. 195 Applicability of each depends on the nature of the offense and respective state
laws; some consequences are mandatory and automatic, while others are imposed on a
case-by-case basis per the discretion of the reviewing agency, institution, or employer. 196
In Illinois, for example, a felony conviction automatically precludes a juvenile from
participating in a College Planning Program, 197 an initiative led by the Illinois Student
Assistance Commission to assist low-income and first-generation students with college
admission. 198 If that conviction involved a "violent offense against youth," the juvenile
must register in a public database maintained by the Illinois State Police for a period of ten
years. 199 A juvenile convicted of possessing or distributing certain amounts of controlled
substances will be permanently

ineligible for cash public assistance. 20 0 Notably, a

convicted felon who later becomes a victim of a violent crime is barred from receiving
financial support under the Crime Victims Compensation Act until discharged from
probation or parole. 20 1
These are just the beginning of an extensive list of statutorily imposed impediments,
yet the law neither requires legal actors to know nor consider the existence of these "hidden
sentences," thereby allowing them to be overlooked. 20 2 It is for this reason that the
American Bar Association and Uniform Law Commission both advocate for state
legislatures to allow judges to consider collateral consequences when imposing a sentence
and to ensure that defendants are informed of such consequences before pleading guilty. 20 3
V.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Illinois youth would benefit from a number of modifications to the state's
discretionary transfer provision and from a requirement for implicit bias training. Although
the state has shifted its focus in recent years to reinstating the original values of the juvenile
court, further improvements are necessary to keep Illinois on the path of progressive reform
and to protect youth from the harmful impacts of discretionary transfer.
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At the outset, the minimum age for discretionary transfer is too low. While linedrawing is perhaps inevitable to some degree, allowing for the criminalization of those as
young as thirteen no longer comports with contemporary understandings of juvenile
criminal responsibility. Confining the responsibility inquiry to a narrow right-versuswrong distinction ignores the developmental context of adolescent delinquency between
the ages of thirteen and seventeen. Comprehending that an action was wrong-which
generally is "adjudged by the moral standards of the community" 20 4 -is distinct from
having the ability to act with the prudence and foresight necessary to appreciate the
consequences of that action.
California's approach, for example, is instructive. At present, California is the only
state in the country prohibiting discretionary transfer of juveniles under sixteen years
old. 20 5 The California legislature voted to amend the state's transfer statute in 2018, raising
the minimum age from fourteen, in light of emerging research. 20 6 In approving the reform,
the legislature noted that "sending youth to adult prison does not help our youth and it does
not make our communities safer," and acknowledged that the practice disproportionately
affects communities of color. 20 7
In its current form, Illinois' discretionary transfer provision mandates a balancing
test that unfairly accords more weight to aggravating factors, rather than mitigating ones.
The court ought to give precedence to the juvenile's mental health, social history, and
family circumstances over the seriousness of the alleged offense and the juvenile's prior
record of delinquency. While youthfulness is not a bar to adjudication in Illinois, it should
be the lead mitigating factor weighing heavily against adult court transfer. The balancing
test also improperly places the frankly generalized and vague "interests of the public"
above the identifiable, individualized interests of youth. Existing research confirms that
higher rates of incarceration do not increase public safety, but that individualized services
that address the root causes of crime do. 20 8 The court's inquiry, by virtue of its balancing
test, militates against juvenile court jurisdiction and is therefore incompatible with the
underlying purposes of the juvenile court.
The state should also consider categorical exclusion of certain crimes from
eligibility, just as it does for presumptive transfers. At present, a juvenile aged thirteen or
older may be discretionally transferred to adult court for any crime, regardless of whether
the offense would constitute a misdemeanor or a felony under the criminal code. Although
it might be presumed that this method of transfer would be invoked only in the most serious
of circumstances, this presumption takes for granted the force of external factors at play,
including public pressure and media coverage over "heater" cases. Boundless discretion
opens the door for misuse. Many nonviolent crimes are appropriate for categorical
exclusion, such as drug offenses, nonviolent property crimes, and simple possession of a
firearm. However, emerging research lends support for retaining juvenile jurisdiction over
204
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206
207
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violent crimes too. It is well established that trauma increases the risk of contact with the
juvenile justice system. 20 9 In recent years, research on this association has centered on the
role of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), a variety of traumatic events occurring
before the age of 18.210 A recent systematic review of studies analyzing the relationship
between ACEs and justice system involvement revealed that higher ACE scores are
associated with up to a 68% higher likelihood for contact. 211 These findings support a
response to delinquency that is both trauma-informed and developmentally appropriate.
Remarkably, the IDJJ recently adopted this position under the leadership of Governor J.B.
Pritzker. The IDJJ, in partnership with the Justice, Equity, and Opportunity Initiative,
announced that by 2024, the state's juvenile justice system would convert to a "21st
Century Illinois Transformation Model," a new evidence-based model focused on
rehabilitation and community integration. 212 On February 2, 2021, the Pritzker
administration reported that the state would repurpose a previously shut-down
development center into a new IDJJ community-based facility founded on traumainformed and restorative justice principles. 213
Additionally, the fact that Illinois continues to use its transfer mechanisms calls for
the adoption of a reverse waiver provision. The absence of such a remedy effectively
presumes that legal system actors are immune to error. The stakes are too high for the only
cure to be appellate review upon final judgment of the adult court, which might not arrive
for years.
In light of the racial disparities and unconscious biases deeply embedded within
juvenile and criminal justice systems, specialized training is essential for all pertinent legal
actors. Judges, probation officers, prosecutors, and defense attorneys should be required to
take implicit bias courses as part of continuing legal education requirements. Encouraging
legal system actors to recognize their own their own biases may prompt them to shape their
behavior accordingly.2 1 4 Indeed, empirical research indicates that self-awareness of one's
own cognitive limitations can improve neutral decision making."215
CONCLUSION

As it stands, the state's discretionary transfer provision presupposes
irreparability-a notion directly in conflict with modern science on adolescent brain
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development, holistic understandings of culpability, and the underlying tenets of the
Juvenile Court Act. To return to the forefront of juvenile justice reform, Illinois should
shift its transfer scheme towards a more developmentally-appropriate approach. Expanding
juvenile jurisdiction is necessary to protect the state's most vulnerable populations from
the grasp of the adult carceral system while also affording accountability. An effective
juvenile justice system is one that rehabilitates, not criminalizes, and contemplates the
complexities of youth.
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